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Faded Red Paradise: 
Welfare and the Soviet City after 1953
I
What was the socialist city? Looked at from one angle, urban space took on a characteristic form in 
the Eastern bloc between the 1950s and 1980s. You know it when you see it: swathes of identical 
housing blocks; windswept concrete squares; statues of Lenin; banners eulogising workers; 
colourless shops without goods; grey crowds; a multiplicity of men in uniform.2 Architects and 
planners, first in the USSR and then across the Eastern bloc, had been committed to the idea and 
practice of the socialist city since the Russian Revolution. This urban form was ultimately about 
three things: striking, self-conscious modernity; the celebration and improvement of working-class 
life; and the construction in physical form of socialist ideology. Welfare was at the centre of this 
vision. As such, the socialist city existed in fundamental contrast to the capitalist city, which was 
shaped by the interests of private property, and the Nazi city, its other modern European 
comparator, whose ultimate driver was the violent assertion of racial purity. The city was at the 
heart of the socialist experiment, which was fundamentally an urban project.
 As ideological enthusiasm waned, the socialist city would fail to reach its utopian potential 
and would in time become merely a faded red paradise. As paradise was falling out of view, during 
the 1970s, sociologists and urban geographers in Western universities imported the Eastern bloc 
notion of the ‘socialist city’ into mainstream Sovietology.3 According to their analysis, ideology 
generated common traits in cities from Varnu to Vladivostok, including the absence of ghettos and 
very poor areas; the removal of class conflict as a factor in shaping the appearance of cities; low 
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crime; highly socialised public services; small numbers of cars; and public space designed around 
the needs of ritual and celebration. Planning was the key to everything. The presumed existence of 
the socialist city is fundamental to a growing historical literature of conceptual richness and 
empirical depth.4 This article seeks to follow this example, but to focus on a period whose urban 
history has received less attention: the years after Stalin.
 But did the socialist city really exist? Cities on either side of the Iron Curtain were actually 
rather similar. The basic features that all modern cities had in common -- roads, apartment houses, 
offices -- were arguably at least as important as any ideological differences that divided them. For 
some observers, urbanisation and industrialisation were universal processes and produced similar 
results, born of comparable technology, bureaucracy and economic development. If all recent 
history is urban history, as Leif Jerram contends,5 then the socialist city was simply one variant of a 
universal form, different from Western cities only in degree, more backward perhaps, short on neon, 
but still the location of a way of life whose urban modernity was in its basic fundamentals the same 
as in the West.
 What is more, historians have shown that the core feature of the socialist city -- socialist 
planning -- was a compromised concept. No one could doubt that planning was a major force in 
Soviet life, not least in terms of city design and welfare provision. But the central bureaucracy 
could never remotely coordinate and predict all economic activity. Local city planning was the 
result not of Olympian professional logic, but of intra-bureaucratic struggles and technical doubts. It 
was modulated by popular pressures, stubborn city identities, and the persistence of urban chaos. 
The state relied on citizens to exercise their individual initiative to get things done. One might 
wonder what was socialist about all this. 
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 Other historians, meanwhile, remind us that every city in the Eastern bloc, not least in the 
Soviet Union, was unique, possessing singular qualities rather than the generalised ones of the 
socialist city. L’vov (L’viv), on the post-1945 western Ukrainian borderlands, was a contested ethnic 
space in the imagination of many residents, and so resists easy categorisation as a socialist city.6 For 
sure, some cities, such as Tol’iatti, were entirely new, built out of nothing,7 but most cities were the 
product of a dialogue with the past.8 Cities had historic zones, especially in the centre. Here, 
neighbourhoods could not be reduced to tidy district units with defined socialist uses. Instead, the 
functions of particular buildings and pockets of territory had evolved over time rather than been 
suddenly transformed. One end of a street could retain a certain cachet, the other end a certain 
notoriety. Such micro-environments remained fundamental to how people experienced urban space 
in ways that seem, on balance, scarcely socialist.
 But these various forces did not squeeze out the socialism from the socialist city.9 Instead, 
they contributed to the creation and development of an urban form that was highly distinctive, but 
far from an ideal type, one whose distinctiveness was further sharpened by transnational exchanges 
between construction professionals within the socialist bloc.10 Focusing on the USSR, and not 
seeking to generalise about the region as a whole, this article explores one of the most important 
aspects of the socialist city: its welfare system.
  In the Soviet Union, welfare was in the first instance an urban phenomenon, a shaper of 
socialist urban modernity. The city was the principal location of welfare infrastructure and its 
dwellers were legally privileged recipients of its services, possessing social rights which rural 
citizens lacked, and which the internal passport and propiska (i.e. legal residence stamp) 
reinforced.11 It was only in a major welfare reform of 1964 that the pensions system was properly 
extended to collective farms, partly resolving a decades-long conflict between city and countryside 
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(it was only a half-decade earlier that the USSR had become a majority urban society). Using 
welfare to privilege cities contrasted with the experience of some democracies, which actively 
worked to redistribute incomes from urban to rural areas, partly under the pressures of sectional 
interests. This was true in Sweden, for example, at least until the 1950s.12
 The argument relies on four overlapping scholarly approaches. Drawing on two of the most 
distinguished works of Soviet urban history of the last twenty years, it follows Stephen Kotkin in 
imagining the Soviet city as a distinctive socialist community,13 and Karl Schlögel in attempting to 
demonstrate the significance of particular urban spaces in making a socialist way of life.14 It is 
influenced too by the ‘spatial turn’ in Russian studies, in which physical space -- from the street to 
the province to the cosmos -- is deployed as the principal factor in explaining historical change in 
Russian culture, society and politics.15 Most recently, the groundbreaking work on migration within 
the Soviet Union by Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moloch reminds us that ideologically 
defined geographical parameters shaped the late socialist way of life.16 The article is also inspired 
by two decades of research by social and cultural historians on the kaleidoscope of post-1945 
urbanity and everyday life, from Stephen V. Bittner on Moscow’s Arbat, to Christopher J. Ward on 
the workers’ settlements of the Baikal-Amur railway line, to Brian LaPierre on city ‘hooligans’.17 
And it draws too on an older planning literature from the 1970s and 1980s, more top-down in 
perspective, to explain some of the routine connections between the welfare system and the Soviet 
city.18
 
 Synthesising these secondary sources with contemporary Soviet publications, such as the 
professional journals of architects and social security staff, and archival documents, especially from 
the Ministry of Social Welfare of the USSR’s Russian Republic (RSFSR) and the welfare 
departments of the city of Moscow, the article combines the perspectives of urban and welfare 
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planners with those of ordinary people, in order to explore how welfare formed the socialist city and 
how the socialist city shaped welfare in four locations: the ‘company town’; the ‘microdistricts’, 
post-Stalin neighbourhood units designed with welfare very much in mind; the interior urban spaces 
where welfare was dispensed, notably the pensions office; and the urban borderlands, where city 
gave way to exurbia and to the vast Soviet countryside. The aim is to demonstrate how these spaces, 
indoors and outdoors alike, were crucial sites of a unique ‘Soviet civilisation’ that was characterised 
by a ubiquitous, penetrating, but unevenly effective welfare system.
II 
Company town
The post-Stalin company town was a legacy of Stalinism.19 It was a maxim of the Stalin era that 
welfare should serve industry. Urban space must facilitate this relationship. Workers gained welfare 
rights (which under Stalin were entirely theoretical) as a result of their employment. Their employer 
dispensed many of the welfare benefits to which they were entitled. Industrial enterprises owned not 
just factories, but apartment blocks, theatres, workers’ clubs, hospitals, and schools.20 In short, the 
company town was an urban environment in which work, domesticity, social services and leisure 
were precisely connected under the auspices of an all-embracing welfare system. Company towns 
ranged from whole cities of little more than a single employer, such as Magnitogorsk, with its 
gargantuan steel works in the Urals; or a metropolitan district, such as the area around the Sickle 
and Hammer industrial complex in Moscow; or the small-scale, so-called workers’ settlements that 
existed across the USSR, built around, say, a timber combine or a railway junction.
 The Soviet Union was scarcely the only country to develop company towns. They had been 
a significant part of the urban landscape of the United States, East Asia and Western Europe, not to 
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mention imperial Russia.  So how was the Soviet company town different?21 Most distinctive of all, 
in terms of international comparison, were the large-scale urban settlements that grew up on the 
permeable edge of prison camps, forming one of the Stalin age’s extraordinary meeting points of 
welfare and violence.22 More generally, beyond the Gulag complex, the Soviet company town was 
different from comparators in the West in four main ways: architecture and planning; the budget; 
the imprint of ideology; and the practice of equality.
 The architecture of the company town expressed a Soviet ideological conviction. From the 
early 1950s, standardisation was required, but it was Soviet-style standardisation. ‘Architects must 
[...] make wide use not only of standardised constructions and parts, but of standardised buildings 
and structures’, decreed a December 1952 conference of architects who worked on company town 
assignments.23 Unlike in, say, the United States, standardised company town architecture had 
communist ambitions. The concluding document of the same architectural conference stated: 
‘Architects must reflect in their creative work the deep changes in social development that have 
happened in the country of socialism.’ As time went on, architects used increasingly sophisticated 
technology to combine welfare with industrial production. This was an especially acute concern in 
heavily polluting plants. In chemical enterprises during the Brezhnev era, for example, architects 
sought to design green squares with multiple functions, including a summer stage, a sports area and 
a zone for relaxation. The whole spatial organisation of the plant’s outdoor welfare facilities was 
focused on reducing the threat from pollution.24 Nowhere were the architectural plans of company 
towns shot through so sharply and consistently by a welfare-inflected state ideology.
 Nevertheless, the most important factor which marked out the Soviet company town from its 
capitalist counterparts was the scale and vision of its budgetary arrangements (which at times did 
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little to ameliorate miserable squalor). Company towns shaped the entire Soviet welfare budget, or, 
to look at it differently, the welfare budget profoundly affected Soviet urban space. 
 Marked rises in investment followed Stalin’s death. Flowing through a range of ministries 
and trade unions, financial allocations increased significantly in the early 1950s.25 The social 
insurance budget that was controlled by the railwayworkers’ trade union was 400 million rubles 
higher in 1954 than it had been in 1951, while the healthcare budget of the Ministry of 
Communications (funding facilities for the same workers) increased by 227 million in the same 
period. New hospitals, polyclinics, and nurseries were constructed in urban areas, while some new 
rest houses and sanatoria were built in exurbia. It seems that the modification of the urban 
environment in major cities, such as Tbilisi, Alma-Ata and Cheliabinsk, was more significant than 
in small settlements. Inspectors praised the hospitals in those big cities, but castigated local officials 
in small settlements for failing to make full use of their welfare budgets.26
 While the state budget, therefore, profoundly affected the design of the company town, it 
could not deliver on the plan. Soviet company towns varied dramatically in size, and those which 
were smallest were most vulnerable to the incapacity and inflexibility of economic planning. Many 
planners recognised that it was impossible to provide welfare services efficiently in very small 
settlements, an argument that gathered force during the Khrushchev era.27 As a result of 
underinvestment, planning failures, and geographical isolation, these small single-employer 
industrial settlements often became squalid places, scarcely the flagships of Soviet civilisation. We 
know little of their history from the inside, but we have evidence of violence and misery in small 
industrial settlements in Leningrad Region in the 1950s, with stories of murder and rape among 
migrant workers.28 These small-scale company towns remained rough-and-ready places, where the 
temporary and the permanent were held in tension, even in the 1970s. ‘This was a bleak and untidy 
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town, neither a city or a village,’ wrote the village prose writer, Valentin Rasputin, in The Fire. ‘It 
was more like a camp site, as if the residents, migrating from place to place, had stopped to wait out  
a storm and to rest up and had simply gotten stuck.’ As a result, welfare was an eternal promise 
rather than a reality. ‘And so the diagram in the town hall showed a recreation centre, but for twenty 
years now this recreation centre had been located in a public bath house brought here from one of 
the old workers’ towns. They should have built a new one, but how could you build anything when 
nothing was visible up ahead until the very last minute?’ Rasputin went on: ‘There was also a 
nursery school on the diagram, but it was not in operation since nobody knew whether it was worth 
renovating. And it became clear that they were in no big hurry. Nobody held anybody responsible 
for these plans.’29
 
 But ideology did remain central to people’s lives in single-employer towns, especially the 
larger ones. ‘The activity of party, soviet, Komsomol and other public [obshchestvennye] 
organisations is connected, to the utmost degree, with production [proizvodstvennye] collectives, 
without which it would be impossible to imagine the social [obshchestvennye] life of small towns,’ 
wrote an urban sociologist in 1972. He included the range of housing, education, welfare and 
leisure services, as well as the construction and regulation of urban space.30 For him, all these things 
-- some of the crucial components of Soviet civilisation as many citizens experienced them -- were 
derived from within the interstices of the company town. And so despite its imperfections, which 
were legion, the company town could formulate a mode of everyday life that was inflected by a 
sense of Soviet civilisation. Dniepropetrovsk was a five-star company town. Closed to foreigners, it 
was a metallurgical centre that became a focus of the space industry during the Brezhnev era. The 
Yuzhmash industrial combine built sports facilities, an airport, the opera house, the historical 
museum, a children’s department store, as well as housing, libraries, cinemas and workers’ clubs.31 
This had some of the features of a ‘total’ urban environment. People’s worldview was formed in 
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such a space, which combined accessible theoretical nostrums -- the slogans about the world 
proletariat that were painted in massive murals on the side of factory buildings -- with a practical, 
everyday experience of what Soviet ideology meant in terms of psychological and material security. 
The anthropologist Alexei Yurchak points out (in a different context) that even relatively worldly 
and sceptical Soviet citizens could remain convinced of the virtues of such aspects of the 
ideological project even in the 1980s.32
 At the heart of this ideological vision was a certain understanding of equality. One could 
even claim that the concept which was most Soviet about the company town was equality, which 
was manifested as a diurnal, dull reality. In a small railway settlement in a metropolitan hinterland, 
there was a bleakness about this equality, thanks to the relative paucity of welfare facilities. But 
equality, driven by welfare, could offer more in bigger company towns. It gave these places their 
most distinctive look. ‘Magnitogorsk is a working-class city without unemployment or even the fear 
of being laid off, without a sizeable and visible underclass,’ wrote Stephen Kotkin in a first-hand, 
Gorbachev-era account of the city. It was a city, he went on, ‘without a conspicuous elite or wealthy  
class, or for that matter without any manifest personal wealth at all.’33 This was mostly a post-Stalin 
phenomenon. The venality of local elites in provincial cities no doubt reinforced the misery of 
ordinary people in the immediate postwar period,34 but during the Khrushchev era, elites’ arrogance 
became less acceptable, and ideological prescriptions concerning equality became ubiquitous. The 
neo-Leninist enthusiasm of the Khrushchev era generated an urban landscape in which equality was 
marked out in concrete, in the profusion of near-identical five-storey prefabricated apartment 
blocks.35 
 
 Hierarchies were, however, more powerfully expressed in spatial form in Soviet cities in the 
1970s and 1980s, perhaps especially in company towns. In a seminal work first published in 1982, 
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the  émigré scholar Victor Zaslavsky offered a number of explanations for this, including the 
tendency for better entrenched elites to reproduce their privileges. He also argued that the 
consolidation of the internal passport system in 1981 ‘maintain[ed] the hierarchy of locations, class 
and ethnic boundaries’. Combined with ‘the institutionalisation of the restricted system of 
administrative distribution of goods and services’, it ensured that some company towns were 
especially privileged locations.36 In elite company towns like those established by the nuclear 
industry, the scope and availability of welfare services, perhaps especially medical care, was 
noticeably better.37 
 But for most Soviet citizens, there seems little doubt that equality continued to shape urban 
space throughout the 1970s and 1980s in ways that forcefully struck foreign observers like the 
1980s American student, Kotkin, and that was very different from the experience of the urban West. 
Equality was a hallmark. The company town survived the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and 
continues to exist today in parts of Russia, but it was the change to the strikingly unequal city that 
was the most distinctive transformation after 1991 in these places.38
III 
The rise and fall of the microdistrict
In larger company towns and decent-sized Soviet cities of all types, the essential urban unit for the 
delivery of welfare was the new neighbourhood housing district, designated ‘microdistrict’ from the 
late 1950s.39 Microdistricts typically contained between five and twenty thousand residents, who 
lived in blocks of flats separated by yards. Architects aimed to provide playgrounds and green areas. 
Within a short walk were schools, kindergartens, and polyclinics -- or they should be, according to 
the plan.40 Other facilities, such as the ‘social welfare offices’ which urban residents had to visit in 
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order to process welfare payments, were not located in every microdistrict. Moscow had twenty-
five district welfare offices in 1956 (which were located at the raion level, roughly commensurate 
with a London borough) though inspectors operated within the microdistrict.41 
 Just as the company town was originally a capitalist form of settlement with a long history, 
the microdistrict had analogues abroad. By the 1950s and 1960s, it was a broadly universal modern 
aim to replace ill-served slums and shanty towns with mass-produced public urban housing 
supported by effective public services. At the fifth congress of the International Union of Architects, 
held in Moscow in 1958, the microdistrict was discussed in these internationally applicable, 
practical terms. Built from scratch, Brasília was divided into ‘superquadros’ of up to 2,500 
residents, with access to appropriate social services.42 In the 1960s, the Soviet microdistrict’s 
function -- taking society to ‘a new level’ through the rationalised delivery of welfare services -- 
was a carefully calibrated, explicitly modernising mission.43 But it was not only this.
 During the Khrushchev era, this welfare agenda was overlaid with a powerful communist 
drive. Most importantly, the ideal of equality was not illusory. With the exception of the senior 
elites, all kinds of people lived in the microdistricts. The doctor and accountant brushed up against 
the factory worker and the cleaner. Meanwhile, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the microdistrict 
was deliberately conceived as one of the primary sites of communist mobilisation. There is 
widespread evidence in citizens’ letters to the authorities that people understood and even 
internalised this communist approach to life. For a spell in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was the 
standard against which many people claimed to measure the welfare framework of their urban 
surroundings.44 Some communal or voluntarist imperatives were not unique to the Soviet Union, 
but they certainly took on a particular form in the communist-inspired microdistrict. At the height of 
the Khrushchev era, Moscow’s Kuibyshev district housing administration committees number 26 
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and 37 created children’s and youth groups, which offered ideological instruction, workshops for 
learning skills, a supervised room for doing homework, and various other facilities. The groups 
were run by parental volunteers and paid professionals. Similar groups were found in Leningrad and 
Erevan, in other parts of Moscow, and no doubt elsewhere.45 
 Across the Soviet Union, the microdistrict was rolled out in cities with very different 
topographies, and in geographical zones with vastly different climates. Despite the considerable 
expense of constructing cities in the Arctic north, Stalinist planners designed them, and 
Khrushchev-era planners fitted them out with microdistricts. This achievement gave the Soviet 
welfare system one of its most distinctive spatial characteristics. It struck at the imagination of 
architects. In a fantastical variant of the microdistrict, a group of Leningrad architects drew up plans 
for community centres in Far Northern cities, which would be enclosed by domes and offer 
artificially mild microclimates. Urban residents would not live inside the dome, but they would 
relax in its green areas and enjoy access to the broad Soviet range of public facilities, such as a 
canteen, hairdresser, shops, social clubs, schools and kindergartens.46
 The Khrushchev era was the high watermark of communist idealism and Leninist 
revivalism. During the years of Brezhnev, by contrast, the microdistrict was a venue not so much 
for the rehearsal of communist practices, as for the accumulation of welfare capacity. For sure, 
ideology made possible the extent and variety of welfare, and in that sense it continued to fashion a 
particularly ‘communist’ system of welfare in the microdistrict. But the communist dreaming had 
certainly gone. Correspondingly, technocracy became more significant. By the end of the 1960s, 
architects and planners were calculating precise levels of would-be provision inside microdistricts. 
One of the sharpest sources of contention was the availability of kindergarten spaces, 
notwithstanding a major expansion (a twofold rise in the 1960s alone).47 Investment was high, and 
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planners promised much. The basic calculation was that for every one thousand inhabitants of a 
microdistrict, between seventy and ninety kindergarten places should exist.48 In such ways was the 
microdistrict -- the core unit of urban space -- supposed to shape social welfare, or, to reverse the 
analysis, did the calculation about necessary levels of welfare affect the design of the city. 
 Forceful political will, activated by a sporadic atmosphere of communist excitement, was 
the prerequisite of Khrushchev’s major social reforms, such as the housing decree of 1957 and the 
pensions laws of 1956 and 1964. When that atmosphere dissipated from the early 1960s on, the 
political capacity to enact major social reforms was disabled. True, spending on welfare remained 
high, but the system as a whole was under pressure from the late 1970s and early 1980s. This had 
consequences inside the microdistrict, especially for pre-school childcare. Notwithstanding the 
planners’ projections, data of 1969 suggested that kindergarten spaces existed for between only 21.1 
per cent and 52.8 per cent of children.49 This was in some places sufficient.  After all, there were 
demographic differences across the USSR: twice as many children were born in Turkmenistan 
compared with Latvia, for example. And many people preferred to take advantage of lengthy post-
natal leave or live-in grandmothers. But other families failed to find the childcare that they needed, 
resorting to ‘informal practices’ and luck. In some places, under the pressure of kindergarten 
shortages alone, the ideal of the microdistrict faded fairly rapidly. In the seventies new town of 
Naberezhnye Chelny (renamed Brezhnev after the General Secretary’s death), parents had to be 
prepared to travel quite long distances to drop off their child at kindergarten before continuing their 
journey to work, dissolving the principle of microdistrict provision.50 
 
  And so from the mid-1960s, the ideological character of the microdistrict became much less 
distinct. Lewis Siegelbaum charts the process whereby the microdistricts of Tol’iatti, a new city of 
the sixties designed to accommodate the construction of cars, started life in a spirit of ‘modernity 
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unbound’, but quickly gave way to Soviet-style shortages and universal modern problems 
associated with high-rise estates and under-pressure welfare systems. He cites an 18,000 shortfall in 
kindergarten places in February 1976.51 Siegelbaum has therefore peeled back evidence of urban 
anomie in the provincial USSR in the 1970s which threatened fundamentally to distort the original 
communist aspirations of the microdistrict. As the 1980s started, architects and planners still used 
communist rhetoric, but in a formulaic way.52 True, some construction projects existed which were 
self-consciously derived from the original microdistrict, such as the ‘housing complexes for young 
people’ (MZhKi), collective-inspired blocks of flats equipped with public facilities, built in thirty 
Soviet cities between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, and which aspired to promote ‘new 
progressive forms of socialist living [obshchezhitiia] [... and] the all-sided development of the 
person, raising his or her voluntary activity [aktivnost’]’.53 But these were a faint echo of 
Khrushchev-era idealism. Indeed, in an Arkhitektura SSSR discussion of autumn 1987 about what 
had become of the socialist city, which included the contributions of several architects, B. Neliubin 
wrote of the problems of ‘drug addicts, drunkenness, social passivity’, which he thought derived 
from the fact that ‘our cities are primitively functional’, and that they had lost their ‘philosophical’ 
and ‘spiritual’ life.54 In other words, the blunt forces of modernisation had lost the guidance of 
communist ideology.
 The microdistrict also came under pressure because urban growth and changes in 
construction technology made it a less useful basic building block of the Soviet welfare system. 
Planners were falling back on less accessible or environmentally safe blocks of land, while 
apartment houses were becoming ever taller and bigger. One architectural commentator writing in 
1982 stated that the microdistrict was ‘losing its distinctness and precision [chetkost’] and social-
planning unity.’ He cited the examples of microdistricts in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, Tol’iatti and 
Naberezhnye Chelny, where several microdistricts were clustered on land between urban 
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motorways [mezhmagistral’naia territoriia].55 The vast size of some apartment blocks changed the 
character of yards. In the original conception of the microdistrict, yards were relatively enclosed 
(zamknutye) and not overcrowded, places in which people would have a sense that the space was 
communally theirs. Now, the pressure on land seemed to reduce people’s ownership over their local 
welfare facilities, as the tightly planned clusters of welfare facilities were disrupted.56 
Modernisation bred impersonality, which seemed uncongenial for socialist society (there was less 
talk of communism these days). By the 1980s, therefore, the ways in which the microdistrict shaped 
the Soviet welfare system had changed. As a spatial factor, it continued to give form to the delivery 
of welfare at a local urban level, and that form persisted into the post-Soviet period. But the content 
had changed. 
IV
The welfare office
So much for the urban outdoors. What about the urban interior? To put the question differently: how 
was people’s experience of welfare, and by extension their understanding of their citizenship, 
affected by the interior spaces in which welfare was dispensed? Welfare offices were the spatial 
manifestation of Soviet citizens’ complex relationship to social insurance. They were the place 
people went to discuss their pensions: to request payment rises, to ask about unexpected payment 
falls, or to plead for special treatment. Pensions were not simply for the elderly, but were a catch-all 
term for various types of welfare benefit. There were pensions for living dependents, dependent 
survivors, the disabled, and the sick. After 1956, urban dwellers enjoyed comprehensive coverage; 
from 1964, a reduced version of the system was extended to those who worked in collective farms. 
But despite the system’s extent, it faced ideological tensions. The relationship between equality and 
moral hazard was particularly difficult.57 In the workers’ state, work was the cardinal virtue. The 
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pensions system was partly predicated on the Leninist principle that crude obsessions with equality 
were ‘petty bourgeois’. In other words, it was entirely right that people who had longer work 
records, or who had earned more because of their skills, or who had endured less desirable labour 
environments, should be better rewarded. It was precisely in the pensions office that this principle, 
more than any other, was debated and brought to life. Anxious or enraged, people came to these 
modest rooms to argue about the essence of Soviet socialism: about why it required them to have a 
better pension.
 On July 14 1956, the party and government approved a decree on state pensions that was 
one of the most far reaching of Soviet welfare reforms. This measure expanded social provision into 
new sectors of the urban economy, clarified and streamlined the whole benefits system, and 
considerably increased the level of welfare payments. It only applied to urban dwellers. Social 
insurance spending per worker increased by sixty per cent as a result of the decree. When the decree 
was brought into force in October 1956, the number of new benefit claimants rose dramatically, 
while most existing claimants obtained higher payments. The day the decree became operational, 
tens of millions of people wanted to know exactly what benefit they could expect to receive and 
how to make sure they received it. In Moscow, as many as 1,500 people queued up at district 
welfare offices (ROSO) every day.58
 This imposed extraordinary pressures on both physical space and staff. Many workers and 
old-age pensioners should have continued to discuss their welfare payments with their trade unions, 
in offices that were located within the precincts of the factory. But the welfare advisers in these 
institutions often found themselves badly briefed on the complex repercussions of the new 
regulations. People therefore flocked to the district offices. Even factory-based welfare 
professionals sometimes joined the queue at the city district offices (run by the city administration, 
! 17
!
or soviet) to try to seek out advice that they could pass on to their claimants, though they were 
heartily criticised for their incompetence.59
 The result was a sequence of encounters, played out in a defined space, that significantly 
affected the popular understanding of welfare. It was the size and layout of the welfare office that 
partly defined people’s status as welfare claimants, and therefore as Soviet citizens. Many district 
welfare offices throughout the RSFSR were located in basements (or ‘semi-basements’) and were 
often very cramped. In Moscow’s Timiriazevskii district, the office was in a basement;60 in the 
capital’s Sovetskii district, with responsibility for 36,000 claimants, the department was sited in a 
small semi-basement. Personnel pointed out that such locations offered little chance of talking 
calmly about complicated and sensitive matters.61 The furniture was often inadequate, sometimes 
with too few chairs for claimants to sit down. As a result, vulnerable people had to queue outside, in 
cold, rain or heat.62 It was not very convincing when the Minister of Social Welfare (RSFSR) 
claimed that, as a result of the 1956 law, many welfare departments had been outfitted, decorated, 
moved to new premises and equipped with new furniture, either on a temporary or a permanent 
basis.63
 Which was more significant: the direct impact of physical space on claimants, or the effect it 
had on the mood and working capacity of officials, which in turn caused problems for claimants, 
sometimes redefining their sense of citizenship? It was usually the officials, not the claimants, who 
were complaining about these conditions. No doubt it is only natural that officials flagged up a way 
of improving the welfare system that coincided with the construction of more comfortable offices 
for themselves. When pensioners of various types described the problems of the benefits system, 
they mentioned ill mannered staff more often than they mentioned cramped conditions. In late 
Stalinist Leningrad, where pensions offices were under acute pressure, dealing with the social 
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insurance claims of the injured and bereaved, veterans especially would sometimes complain to the 
press about the conditions they experienced in these offices. It was precisely veterans who were 
experiencing an offended sense of entitlement, a diminution in their understanding of their 
citizenship.64 Most often, however, it seems that it was the rudeness of staff and their obsessive 
adherence to the letter of bureaucratic regulation that drove veterans to distraction.65
 At moments of particular pressure, not just the postwar, but also, for example, following the 
introduction of the 1956 decree, the novelty of regulations, the sheer number of claimants, and the 
complexity of case files frayed the nerves of staff. Of course, the stress never really went away -- 
after all, staff were scarcely seeing clients when they were at their most relaxed -- and they 
sometimes responded by shutting up shop at the first opportunity. Officials from the railway 
workers’ trade union who were investigating pensions queues spotted a disabled man who had 
struggled to get to the welfare office in Moscow’s Kirov district, and who arrived fifteen minutes 
late: he was ‘driven back’ (not home by complimentary taxi, but away from the office by the sharp 
words of the social welfare personnel).66 True, many officials were much more conscientious. But 
welfare officials exercised considerable power over individual cases, and they sometimes dispensed 
it with an ungenerous tone. 
 Does this mean that the relationship between official and claimant was asymmetric? Or, 
conversely, was it regulated by rights? In 1961, the welfare department in Moscow’s Frunzenskii 
district was still located in a basement that lacked natural light. It consisted of four small rooms plus 
a ground-floor reception. It was a total of 238 square metres from which to serve 48,000 pensioners, 
and was not extended when the district was made bigger following a rezoning of city districts. 
Sixteen accounts workers found themselves two to a desk.67 But there is evidence of improvement. 
A report of 1968 urged managers at district level to make sure that welfare claimants were at the 
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centre of their processes: the aim of officials should be to ensure that people had the chance to fulfil 
their rights; the physical condition of the reception room and the processes of receiving the public 
should reduce queues and foster ‘cultured’ conditions.68 In 1969, a pensions inspector in Moscow’s 
Kalinin district praised the reorganisation of district borders that had changed the composition of 
his own district and also created a new Perovo district, because it made possible a much more 
efficient service for the local population. He claimed they had a motto: ‘to serve the citizens of the 
district in a cultured, polite way, in order that not one comrade who has been in our departments 
should go away dissatisfied.’69  In 1974, P. Mitrakov, a senior social welfare official in the Siberian 
city of Krasnoiarsk, called a department’s reception ‘a mirror of the work of the department’. If the 
reception dealt with a large numbers of the public -- 12,000 of them every year -- then it was the 
small details of the interior that should make possible ‘a calm, business-like conversation’.70
One might compare the places where people came to talk about pensions and housing. Sociological 
surveys of the 1960s and 1970s suggested that most people found the pensions office a more 
congenial environment than the local housing administration (ZhEK).71 Housing issues were 
probably the most contested and anxiety-inducing everyday problems in all of Soviet life. Perhaps it  
was indeed the case that the welfare office became a lower-stress environment in the Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev eras thanks to its physical improvements, the greater professionalism of its staff, and 
the less asymmetric relationship between officials and the rights-bearing public. 
 As time went on, not only did the physical conditions in welfare offices improve, but so did 
the qualifications of the staff, which also became increasingly female. The Pervomaiskii district 
welfare department, which had won socialist competitions in 1970 and 1971, proclaiming it the best  
run in Moscow, dealt with 85,000 pensioners and benefits recipients, requiring 10,000 files to be 
prepared for further attention every year. Compared with the departments which had struggled so 
much in 1956, the Pervomaiskii department in 1971 contained more staff with more qualifications. 
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Working in social security offices was responsible and stressful. Being a pensions official carried a 
similar status to that possessed by those who worked in other public-facing departments, such as the 
ZhEKi. But their salaries were relatively low. In the early 1980s, teachers and factory workers could 
both expect to earn more.72 Nevertheless, welfare officials enjoyed the prestige associated with 
responsibility, education, and, even in the workers’ state, the comfort of working in a clean white-
collar environment. Their relationship with claimants was quite different from that of the 
counterparts in capitalist countries. By the 1980s, welfare bureaucrats in Britain were moving from 
a language of the ‘client’ towards one of the ‘consumer’, in an attempt more closely to invest 
claimants with rights and citizenship. But their accounts of how this works in practice remind the 
Soviet historian that they were dealing with poorer and weaker social groups.73 In the United States, 
the history of welfare bureaucracy and the regulation of the poor might be synonymous.74
 But the Soviet welfare system was entirely different. It was for everyone, all of the time. The 
welfare office might have had a faded décor by the late socialist period. It might have lost the bright 
red promise of the Khrushchev years. But it was still a fundamentally different place to its 
comparators in capitalist countries. The Soviet welfare office was not just a place of bitter 
confrontation, the site of individuals’ post-catastrophes, as it was in Weimar Berlin, for example.75 
It was the spatial embodiment of a grander goal. The Soviet welfare system was much more 
concerned with the regulation of society as a whole than just the regulation of the poor. As such, the 
urban welfare system reached not just into the pensions office, but also went beyond the city limits.
V
Urban, exurban: the boundaries of the welfare city
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It seemed that the boundaries of the Soviet city were precisely defined: that a line separated what 
was urban from what was rural. In administrative terms, a town and its surrounding region were 
separate categories; in Tiraspol in the 1960s and 1970s, the executive committees that governed the 
city and region were in the same building, but had little to do with each other.76 And according to 
urban planners, the city was an entity with clearly drawn edges. Nowhere was this truer than in 
Moscow, whose borders coincided with the outer ring road.77 Spatial boundaries were mirrored by 
legal ones. Residency laws were hierarchical, predicated on the assumption, first, that living in a 
city bestowed more rights than living in a village and, second, that some cities were more privileged 
than others. Socialism was in the first instance an urban project and the Soviet Union was, after all, 
the industrial workers’ state. 
 Being an urbanite carried a specific status and offered access to particular types of welfare.78 
A stamp in the internal passport granted a citizen the right to live in a particular place, and the place 
could not easily be upgraded. This very stamp mediated access to a pension. Collective farm 
workers were not part of the wider state welfare system until 1964. When people moved to cities 
without seeking formal permission -- an isolated parent, say, coming to live in a son’s overcrowded 
Kiev flat -- they would automatically lose access to all social security provision. Social security 
professionals were aware of the problem and sometimes bent the rules to help such people out.79 
But the law was clear. Social rights in the USSR were contingent on location. This did not make the 
Soviet Union unique -- one only has to look to the blend of federal and state entitlements in the 
United States, or the complex geographical range of rights-based benefits in India, for example -- 
but it was a fundamental fact of Soviet life.
 A legal history of Soviet welfare would therefore emphasise the significance of the city 
limits. By contrast, a spatial history would stress the fuzziness of the urban boundary. This is a 
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paradox, given the importance that urban planners placed on the city as a discrete unit. But in the 
use of physical space for the purposes of welfare, city and non-city were not quite distinct.
 Khrushchev considered this relative fuzziness a policy position. In 1949, he had recklessly 
announced his support for the principle of the ‘agro-town’. The idea was that rural settlements 
should have more urban trappings, and that the gap in standard of living between city and 
countryside should narrow. Accused of speaking out of turn, he had to admit that this was a mistake. 
But it seemed to be his view, and he was anyway giving voice to an older model of Soviet 
urbanisation, according to which towns should grow and export their qualities to their rural 
surroundings, without simply creating badly served urban outskirts.80 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
Khrushchev returned to an attenuated version of the principle of mixed rural-urban forms of 
settlement, in which, he hoped, large villages would come to many of the social and infrastructural 
advantages of towns. Welfare services, broadly conceived, were at the heart of this vision. It drew 
on a minor tradition in Soviet town planning, such as the ‘disurbanist’ thinking of the 1920s,81 and 
also fitted within both the Stalinist and post-Stalinist variants of post-war reconstruction and 
urbanisation.82
 However urban it might have seemed, the company town was never far from rural life. Even 
in a vast complex of gigantic furnaces and endless pipes, much of the workforce had recently 
migrated from the village. In the postwar years, many factories effectively ran their own farms, 
without which they would have been unable to feed their workers. The deputy chairman of the 
Architecture Committee of the Council of Ministers (USSR), B.P. Rubanenko, pointed out at an 
inter-departmental conference in March 1948 that many towns -- he mentioned Nizhnii Tagil and 
Kemerovo, among others -- effectively contained around twenty or thirty backward settlements 
(poselki). This was ‘a disreputable practice’, he claimed.83 The fear was that normal urban 
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conditions were compromised, and that the systematic provision of decent housing -- Rubanenko’s 
primary concern -- would be impossible.
 After the end of the postwar emergency, welfare generated a different relationship between 
town and country. Rather than the exurban infecting the integrity of the city’s welfare provision, the 
city made use of the welfare potential of the countryside on a much more systematic scale than 
hitherto. The welfare resources of company towns extended to sanatoria and rest houses, places 
where workers could go for health-focused holidays or periods of recuperation and recovery from 
illness and injury.84 Ordinary people had increasing opportunities to build or purchase dachas:85 a 
process which might be perceived as a benign collision of property law and social policy. Some 
institutions organised countryside or seaside facilities for employees’ children (though most Pioneer 
camps were owned and managed by the hierarchy of the Komsomol).
 Pioneer camps were a central example of the city making use of the countryside -- in a 
sense, colonising it -- for welfare purposes. When Viacheslav Molotov visited the showcase Artek 
Pioneer camp, spectacularly located on the Crimea, in August 1955, the director proudly told him: 
‘In Moscow there is not even a proper Pioneer palace.’86 Within three years, work would start on 
precisely such a facility, in Moscow’s Lenin Hills; the Moscow Pioneer Palace was finished in 
1962.87 But the Artek director’s point was telling. Moscow needed exurbia in its multiple guises in 
order to provide welfare.
 When the village prose writer Vladimir Soloukhin spent the summer of 1956 walking 
around his native countryside, a hundred miles or so from Moscow but seeming much further away, 
he was also, incidentally, walking across a landscape of exurban welfare. He wanted to get off the 
beaten track, but he saw Pioneer camps, rest houses and old people’s homes. These were rural 
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outposts of the giant Soviet welfare system. They provided summer childcare and ideological 
instruction, health-focused holidays dispensed by trade unions, and state-run accommodation and 
care for relatively small numbers of elderly people. Some of this was for rural inhabitants. But 
much of it was for urbanites.88 
 **********
The Soviet welfare system shaped Soviet cities; Soviet cities shaped the Soviet welfare system. 
Other factors contributed to the design and experience of urban form and welfare alike. But this 
symbiotic relationship between city and welfare was a crucial aspect of Soviet history. Generalising 
about the ‘socialist city’, the ‘Nazi city’ and the ‘capitalist city’ is reductive and ultimately 
counterproductive. But it is surely true that the Soviet city, like the socialist city more generally, 
was defined to a considerable extent by the welfare that was dispensed within it. The capitalist and 
Nazi city, by contrast, were most obviously defined, respectively, by private property relations and 
the politics of violent racial exclusion. Recovering some of the particular places in which Soviet 
urban welfare was experienced -- the company town, the microdistrict, the welfare office, and 
exurbia -- thus takes us closer to the distinctiveness of the post-1953 Soviet city. True, it lost the 
most striking ambition of the Khrushchev years, and became only a faded version of paradise, 
marked by imperfections and incapacities, and partly shaped by universal modernising forces. But 
the spatial expression of ideology ultimately made the Soviet city the flagship of a highly particular 
civilisation.
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